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Abstract 
This paper empirically analyzes the role of institutional factors in shaping the dynamics of gross 
capital flows. We build an institutional quality index and test its relevance for both gross capital 
inflows and outflows using a panel of 56 countries, differentiating between high-income and 
low-income economies, over the period 1996-2012. We find that institutional quality is a 
significant factor affecting the behavior of both foreign and domestic investors. Countries 
with better governance and public sector credibility tend to attract more flows. Causality is 
confirmed through IV estimates for a sub-sample of 25 countries. In addition, we show that 
some governance features matter more than others. Specifically, the most relevant institutional 
indicators are Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality, which capture the government’s 
ability to implement adequate, sound and credible policies. Finally, we assess the role of 
institutional quality during periods of financial stress. The analysis suggests that domestic 
investors in countries with a sound institutional framework tend to retrench more capital, 
mitigating the negative effects of declining gross capital inflows. Therefore, sound institutions 
incentivize the build-up of external assets in high-income countries by promoting larger 
outflows in normal times. They also facilitate the repatriation of such assets during crises. 
Keywords: gross capital flows, institutions, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
capital retrenchment and crises.  
JEL Classification: F21, F32 y F33. 
  
Resumen 
Este trabajo analiza de forma empírica el papel que desempeñan los factores institucionales 
en la determinación de los flujos brutos de capital. Se construye un índice de calidad 
institucional y se evalúa su impacto en la evolución de las entradas y de las salidas de capital 
brutas, utilizando un panel de 56 países y distinguiendo entre economías de altos ingresos y 
de bajos ingresos, entre 1996 y 2012. Se muestra que la calidad institucional es un factor 
significativo para explicar el comportamiento tanto de inversores extranjeros como de 
inversores nacionales. Los países con un entorno más favorable en términos de gobernanza 
y de credibilidad del sector público tienden a atraer más flujos de capital. Gracias al análisis 
econométrico de variables instrumentales, se confirma la existencia de causalidad para una 
submuestra de 25 países. Asimismo, señalamos que determinados rasgos institucionales son 
más importantes que otros. En concreto, los indicadores institucionales más relevantes son 
Eficacia gubernamental y Calidad regulatoria, que captan la capacidad del Gobierno para 
implantar políticas adecuadas, fiables y creíbles. Por último, se evalúa el papel de la calidad 
institucional en períodos de estrés financiero. El análisis sugiere que los inversores nacionales 
residentes en países con un marco institucional sólido tienden a repatriar más capital, 
mitigando parcialmente los efectos negativos de una menor entrada de flujos de capital 
brutos. Por tanto, una buena calidad institucional incentiva la acumulación de activos 
externos en los países de altos ingresos, mediante una mayor salida de capitales en tiempos 
normales, pero también facilita la repatriación de dichos activos en épocas de crisis.  
Palabras clave: flujos brutos de capital, instituciones, eficacia gubernamental, calidad regulatoria, 
repatriación de capital y crisis. 
Códigos JEL: F21, F32 y F33.   
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1 Introduction 
Cross border capital flows play an increasingly important role in the global economy. In order 
to reap the benefits associated with capital inflows, many governments followed a capital 
account liberalization strategy in the past decades. Economic theory suggests that 
international capital flows boost productive capacity, promote competitiveness and enhance 
efficiency. While capital flows can bring potential benefits to the financial system, they also 
carry risks due to their volatility, size and the channels of contagion that they create. To 
prevent the materialization of these risks, a better understanding of capital flows is imperative. 
While there is extensive empirical research on net capital flows, it is only recently that 
a new strand of literature has paved the way for research on gross capital flows. Following 
Forbes and Warnock (2012), and Broner et al (2013), we differentiate between the behavior of 
domestic agents investing abroad (gross capital outflows) and foreign agents investing in the 
reporting country (gross capital inflows)1. As gross financial flows have substantially increased 
in the last decade and domestic agents and foreign agents can be motivated by different 
factors, this distinction is all the more relevant. On the other hand, a country´s economic 
performance is highly influenced by its institutional and political environment (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2005). Building on these ground-breaking papers, we contribute to 
the literature by showing the role played by institutional factors in determining gross capital 
flows in the long term but also during periods of financial stress. 
Gross capital flows play a significant role as a transmission channel of financial 
stability, as we have witnessed during the global financial crisis. Capital flow volatility 
increased in the last decade as cross border flows skyrocketed from 2001 until the global 
financial crisis, when they contracted sharply, and then surged again in 2010.  Figure 1 shows 
that there is a high correlation between the behavior of non-residents buying net domestic 
assets and residents buying net foreign assets due to the significant financial integration 
among these economies. However, when looking at the flows of emerging economies (Figure 
2), this correlation is much lower and this difference is even more relevant if we take a 
particular emerging economy. As net flows reflect only a small part of international 
movements, it is of interest to analyze the behavior of foreign and domestic agents separately.  
                                                                          
1. Gross capital inflows are defined as the difference between the purchases and sales of domestic assets by non-
residents, which are the sum of all liabilities (FDI, portfolio and other investment). Analogously, gross capital outflows are 
the difference between the purchases and sales of foreign assets by residents, which can be decomposed into FDI, 
portfolio and other investment assets. 
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The objective of this paper is to assess the role of institutions as a driver of global 
capital flows over the last twenty years, highlighting the significant changes in the behavior of 
domestic and foreign investors during periods of financial stress. The focus is on two 
questions. How relevant are institutions to explain the pattern of flows in the long term? And, 
in periods of financial stress, do markets discriminate among economies according to their 
institutions? Our main hypothesis relies on the fact that foreign agents might base their 
decisions not only on economic pull factors but also on institutional pull factors. In contrast to 
the neoclassical theory for which the crucial factor of institutional quality was the security of 
property rights, we base our analysis on a broad definition of “good governance”. Institutional 
quality refers to the governance infrastructure of countries, defined broadly as “the traditions 
and institutions by which authority is exercised”, (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2004). This 
definition includes the political process, civil liberties, the ability of governments to implement 
sound and credible policies and the respect for institutions. The neoclassical theory predicts 
that capital flows to countries with a higher marginal rate of return. But institutional quality can 
affect the expected net value of investment as it takes into consideration property rights and 
the credibility of government policy. An improvement in institutional quality should attract 
more capital inflows if investors look for safer investments (flight to quality hypothesis). In 
contrast, institutions also affect domestic decisions. There is a trade-off. On the one hand, a 
sound institutional framework creates a market-friendly environment, boosting domestic 
demand and foreign investment. On the other hand, if the political ability or the property rights 
of a country improve, domestic agents might allocate more resources in their residence 
country instead of abroad, which effect prevails is a matter that should be empirically tested.   
To assess the relevance of these hypotheses, we build a database comprising of 
quarterly data for 56 countries, differentiating between high-income and low and middle-
income states, over the period 1996-2012. As far as we know, there has not been a 
systematic attempt to analyze the linkage between gross capital flows and governance, but 
only on the relation between foreign direct investment (FDI) and institutional quality. 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) conclude that governance is a relevant driver of both inward 
and outward FDI for developed and developing countries over 1995-1997. Buchanan et al 
(2012) find that institutional quality is positively associated with FDI and negatively correlated 
to FDI volatility. There has not been much discussion regarding the impact of institutional 
factors during financial crises. We contribute to the literature by creating an institutional quality 
index over 1996-2012 and assessing its impact on the behavior of gross capital flows and 
their components. Our main findings are the following. First, employing fixed effect models, 
our results clearly suggest that institutional quality is an important driver of gross capital flows, 
mainly driven by the dynamics of FDI and portfolio flows. Countries with better quality public 
services tend to attract more investment and, in high-income countries, create an adequate 
environment to boost economic activity and investment abroad. Indeed, IV estimates suggest 
the existence of a causal link for a sub-sample of 25 countries. Secondly, Government 
Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality seem to be the most important determinants of capital 
flows. Finally, institutional quality turns out to be also relevant during periods of financial 
stress. Domestic investors tend to retrench more capital flows if they live in countries with a 
sound institutional framework, which compensates for the negative effects of declining capital 
inflows. Therefore, good institutions incentivize the build-up of external savings, by promoting 
larger outflows, in normal times in high-income countries. And, then, they also facilitate the 
repatriation of such assets during crises. 
This paper is related to different lines of literature. First, it is closely related to the 
considerable empirical research on the determinants of net capital flows during the last 
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decades. These analyses distinguish between push and pull factors. The former focuses on the 
relevance of external factors such as international liquidity or risk aversion. In this context, Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart (1993) emphasize the importance of external factors, such as lower 
international rates and the recession in the United States, to explain the significant capital inflows 
to Latin American economies in the nineties. Dixit and Pindyck´s (1994) focus on the role of 
investor risk appetite. More recently, scholars have drawn attention to the effects of “global 
liquidity”. Bruno and Shin (2013) consider the importance of the leverage cycle of global banks. 
A different strand of literature highlights the relevance of pull factors, such as sound 
macroeconomic policies and institutional quality. This is the case of Papaioannou (2009) which 
shows how institutions and the initial level of institutional quality affect international lending. 
Finally, Fratzscher (2012) concludes that both pull and push factors are relevant depending on 
the period of time. Global drivers seem to play an important role in periods of financial stress, 
whereas specific factors are more relevant in periods of economic recovery.  
The empirical results of these papers can partially explain the Lucas Paradox. The 
standard neoclassical theory predicts that capital flows to poor countries where the marginal 
rate of return is higher. But the evidence does not support this argument as capital has not 
moved from rich to poor countries, but within developed countries: this is referred as the 
Lucas Paradox. However, when modifying perfect market assumptions, the paradox 
disappears. There are different theories: a group analyses international capital market 
imperfections whereas another part of the literature focuses on differences in fundamentals 
and institutions. Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2008) conclude that low institutional 
quality is the ultimate explanation. The Lucas Paradox can also be explained by the increasing 
demand for global safe assets. According to Caballero (2010), emerging economies face a 
deficit of safe assets, partly explained by their limited institutional capacity and the lack of 
development of their local bond markets. Therefore, flows tend to move from emerging 
economies to developed markets in search of sound financial assets, specifically triple A 
instruments. Even if related with this strand of literature, our analysis cannot give a conclusive 
explanation to the Lucas Paradox since the data used focuses exclusively on one direction 
flows without controlling for the counterpart country. In addition, we analyze the behavior of 
gross capital flows and not net capital flows as Lucas did.  
The most recent literature has turned its attention to gross capital flows and their 
behavior during periods of financial stress. Forbes et al (2012) identify periods of extreme flow 
volatility and define the following episodes: “surges” and “flight”- increase in gross capital 
inflows and outflows respectively- and “stops” and “retrenchment”- decreases in gross capital 
inflows and outflows respectively. According to Broner et al (2013), capital flows are pro-
cyclical and tend to collapse during periods of financial crises. Finally, Milesi-Ferreti and Tille 
(2011) conclude that the global financial crisis led to a “great retrenchment” of capital flows, 
especially in 2008Q4, affecting to a lesser extent emerging economies.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the data. 
Section 3 describes the baseline empirical model and reports fixed effect estimates. This 
section is divided into two parts. The first subsection analyzes the effect of institutional quality 
on capital flows and tackles the endogeneity bias of institutional indicators using instrumental 
variable estimates, whereas the second subsection introduces the different characteristics of 
institutional governance. In section 4, we analyze the impact of crises on capital flow drivers 
introducing a dummy in our baseline model and interacting it with institutional quality. We 
complement this analysis distinguishing between global and domestic crises. Section 5 
concludes and highlights some policy implications.  
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2 Data and methodology 
The dataset used covers 56 countries, including 34 high-income countries and 22 low and 
middle-income countries over the period 1996-2012, using quarterly data. This period allows 
us to analyze the behavior of capital flows during the Russian and Asian crises (1998-1999) 
and during the global financial crisis (2008-2009). As Broner et al (2013), we divide our 
sample into groups depending on their income levels as classified by the World Bank in July 
2010. According to 2008 gross national income (GNI) per capita, lower-middle income 
groups are those economies with a GNI per capita between $976 and $3,855, upper-middle 
income groups between $3,856- $11,905 and high income groups above $11,906. As only 
six countries of our sample (Colombia, India, Indonesia, Peru, The Philippines and Thailand) 
belong to the lower-middle income group, we will use low and middle-income to refer to both 
lower-middle and upper middle-income countries. Thanks to income differentiation, we are 
able to show that some institutional quality features play a different role depending on the 
country´s level of income2. Table 1 reports the countries analyzed. Our database excludes 
countries that did not report the Balance of Payments or with a limited time series, which in 
the case of being related to a bad performance of institutions, can lead to a sample selection 
issue. The data can be separated into capital flows, institutional proxies and control variables. 
2.1 Capital flows data: 
Capital flows data are taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. This source 
has several advantages. First, it allows us to disaggregate flows by instruments: foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio and other investment flows. Secondly, it uses the Balance of 
Payment data, enabling us to use quarterly data. This data frequency allows us to capture the 
impact of short-term changes on investor decision making, such as the fall of Lehman 
Brothers, and to assess the relevance of institutions during the global financial crisis. 
However, contrary to other sources, this data does not give a decomposition of private and 
public issuers and holders of debt for most countries over long periods of time. Following 
Broner el al (2013) and Alberola, Erce and Serena (2012), we distinguish between financial 
investment by non-residents in the reporting economy (Gross capital inflows, CI)-including 
investment and disinvestment- and by residents abroad (Gross capital outflows, CO)-taking 
into account net purchases. Gross capital inflows are measured as the sum of all liability 
inflows -direct investment (Ifdi), portfolio (Iportfolio) and other investment inflows (Ioinv)-. 
Analogously, gross capital outflows are calculated as the sum of outflows of direct investment 
(Ofdi), portfolio (Oportfolio) and other investment inflows (Ooinv). We not only focus on 
aggregate capital inflows and outflows, but also on their components as their drivers might be 
different. These eight measures of capital flows are normalized by the reporting country GDP 
to control for their economic size, and then standardized by de-meaning and by dividing the 
standard deviation at the country level, following Broner et al (2013). 
2.2 Institutional indicators: 
In order to assess the role of institutional quality as a determinant of capital flows, we use a 
set of institutional variables from the Worldwide Governance indicators, estimated by 
Kaufman et al (1999)3. Contrary to other database used by the literature, such as the “political 
                                                                          
2. High-income countries include also some European economies that have been under financial stress during the 
European debt crisis. 
3. They use an unobserved component model to collect perceptions of governance gathered through a wide variety of 
cross-country surveys and poll of experts from different sources 
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risk rating” calculated by the International Country Guide, the data is publicly available. In 
addition, it reports six dimensions of governance for a large number of countries over 1996-
2012: (1) Voice and Accountability, (2) Political Stability and Lack of Violence, (3) Government 
Effectiveness, (4) Regulatory Quality, (5) Rule of Law and (6) Control of Corruption. Voice and 
Accountability reflects aspects of the political process and political rights. Political Stability 
and Lack of Violence capture the likelihood of an unconstitutional change in government with 
or without violence. Government Effectiveness includes the credibility of policies and the 
quality of public services and civil services and its independence from political pressures. 
Regulatory Quality focuses on the ability to implement policies to boost private sector 
development. The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions is captured by Rule of 
Law-which analyzes the quality of property rights, the police and the likelihood of crime and 
violence- and Control of Corruption, which determines how public power is exercised. This 
broad definition of governance allows us to test the importance of different dimensions of 
institutional quality as determinants of capital flows4. This dataset has been used in several 
papers as a proxy for institutional quality in order to assess the effect of institutions on FDI. 
(See Globerman and Shapiro (2002), Buchanan et al (2012) and Daude and Stein (2007)). 
As these indicators are highly correlated, we need to make some transformations. 
First of all, we create an institutional quality index by extracting a component of the six 
governance indicators, using a principal component analysis. From a principal component 
regression, we choose the first component as it turns out to be the component with most 
predicting power5. Table 2 in Appendix reports the results of the principal component 
regression. The creation of this index has several advantages. First, the aggregation of 
different aspects of governance tends to reduce measurement errors. As these six indicators 
are closely correlated, the index might be more accurate than its components. Secondly, this 
index enables us to analyze the impact of institutional quality on gross capital flows. Lastly, it 
sorts out multicollinearity issues. Then, in order to discriminate between the different features 
of governance, there are two options: either including each institutional variable one by one in 
our baseline model or using a backward demeaning transformation-subtracting each 
institutional variable by its backward mean at the country level. We opt to choose the latter. If 
various institutional features determine simultaneously gross capital flows, there might be an 
omitted variable bias when including them one by one, especially relevant as they are highly 
correlated. Therefore, we are able to reduce multicollinearity by using a backward demeaning 
transformation, as shows the correlation matrix in Table 3. Thanks to this transformation, we 
can analyze the effect of variations in institutional quality features on investor´s decisions.   
A disadvantage of using Worldwide Governance indicators is that these variables are 
based on subjective perceptions. However, as pointed out by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2004), objective measures of governance across countries might not exist, for instance in the 
case of corruption, or they may not be comparable between countries. This is partly due to 
the differences between “de jure” and “de facto” situations regarding institutional quality. In 
addition, one can argue that in fact investors´ decisions are based on subjective perceptions 
of governance, due to the lack of objective information. Another drawback is that their 
estimates do not convey information about global trends of governance since the global 
average is equal to zero. Nevertheless, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) argue that 
there is no evidence of systemic trends related to world average governance when analyzing 
individual data sources. The results vary depending on the source and on the type of 
                                                                          
4. All scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, higher scores indicating better governance quality before the transformation. 
5. As many researchers, like Jolliffe (1982), have stressed the principal components with low variance can also be 
important in predicting outcomes and in determining causal relationships. 
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governance indicator. In addition, it has the advantage of keeping some of the cardinal 
information of the underlying data, while providing information about changes in the relative 
positions of countries over time. Therefore, relative and absolute changes in a country‘s 
governance are likely to be similar.  
2.3 Control variables data 
We choose pull factors widely used in the literature-the country´s GDP growth, the spread of 
long term interest rates, public debt to GDP, credit to GDP, the ratio of reserves including 
gold to GDP, credit to GDP and the quadratic term of credit to GDP - and relevant push 
factors- the volatility index (VIX), the world GDP growth and US long term interest rates. Some 
variables have been excluded following a stepwise procedure as they turn out to be 
insignificant. This is the case for inflation, primary balance and commercial openness. In 
addition, we exclude the financial openness index (Chinn-Ito Index) from the baseline model 
due to its lack of variability for high-income economies and we only use it in a robustness 
check model. The data appendix provides information about the sources and definitions of all 
variables. (Table 4)  
In order to assess the role of institutional quality during periods of financial stress, we 
use a dummy on a quarterly basis to identify periods of crises using the database from 
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012). Our crisis indicator takes into consideration banking, 
currency and sovereign debt crises6, distinguishing between domestic and global crises. The 
latter corresponds to the Russian and Asian crises (1998 and 1999) and the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). Table 5 takes into consideration and provides details of the exact periods of 
crises per country.  
2.4 Descriptives: 
Table 6 in Appendix reports descriptive statistics of capital flows and governance indicators, 
whereas Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of control variables. As shown in Table 6, 
cross-country institutional quality varies across countries. For instance, institutional quality 
index ranges from -6.05 for Venezuela in 2010 to 3.5 for Finland in 2004; higher scores 
indicating better governance. Figure 3 shows the cross-country variation. In 2012, the country 
with the worst political institutions was Venezuela whereas Finland and Sweden benefitted 
from a sound governance framework. In addition, the “within” country variation in this panel 
data is also relevant, as observed in Figure 4. While Argentina and Greece have witnessed a 
worsening of their governance indicators, Estonia and Korea have substantially improved in 
terms of governance.   
                                                                          
6. Laeven and Valencia define banking crises when a large part of the private sector (financial and non financial 
companies) is in default or facing liquidity issues, and, therefore non-performing loans surge and most capital is 
exhausted. A country experiences currency crisis when its currency depreciates at least 30 percent in nominal terms, if it 
represents a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the previous year. Finally, debt crises include 
the year of sovereign defaults to private lending.  
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3 Determinants of capital flows. Panel estimates 
3.1  Institutional quality index 
3.1.1 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Due to the lack of a benchmark model to analyze capital flow drivers, we use a general model 
controlling for common determinants of capital flows and introduce institutional quality index. 
As a starting point, in order to assess the role of institutional quality in shaping capital flows, 
our baseline model is: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܫܳ݅݊݀݁ݔ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶᇱ݌ݑ݈݈݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷᇱ݌ݑݏ݄݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧												ሺ1ሻ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	 ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ሼܥܫ௜௧; ܥ ௜ܱ௧; ܫ݂݀݅௜௧; ܫ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋௜௧; ܫ݋݅݊ݒ௜௧; ܱ݂݀݅௜௧; ܱ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋௜௧; ܱ݋݅݊ݒ௜௧ሽ 
Where ௜ܻ௧  is in terms of GDP for country i in year and quarter t. The main interest of 
this empirical analysis is on the sign and magnitude of ߚଵ as ܫܳ݅݊݀݁ݔ௜௧ represents the 
institutional quality index that captures the level of governance quality.  ߚ଴	is the constant 
term; ݌ݑ݈݈݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ିଵ is a vector of domestic variables (7x1) that affect capital flows. It 
includes (the country´s GDP growth, the spread of long term interest rates, public debt to 
GDP, gross external debt to GDP, the ratio of reserves including gold to GDP, credit to GDP 
and the quadratic term of credit to GDP). Global variables are included in the vector (3x1) 
݌ݑݏ݄݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧, which includes (the VIX level, world GDP growth and US long term interest 
rates). We include a country fixed specific effect,	ߤ௜, to control for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity effects and year and quarterly dummies, ߬௧, to control for unobserved shocks 
that affect all countries. The use of lagged variables in pull factors7 and country and year fixed 
effects mitigates endogeneity issues. In addition, we run fixed effects (within) regressions with 
Discroll-Kraay standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-
sectional dependence8.  
3.1.2 MAIN RESULTS 
Table 7 reports the results. Focusing on our main contribution, the role of institutional 
variables, we find that gross capital flows are highly associated with institutional quality. As 
expected, an improvement in political institutions attracts more capital inflows (CI) if foreign 
investors look for safer investments. Indeed, the expected net present value of investments in 
countries with better governance can improve thanks to a reduction of uncertainty. Foreign 
agents can consider countries with institutional vulnerabilities riskier. This is true for all income 
countries and for the two sub-samples analyzed. With regards to gross capital outflows (CO), 
the sign of institutional quality is also positive and significant for high-income economies, 
signaling that improvements in governance will facilitate the build-up of external savings. A 
sound institutional framework creates a market friendly environment and incentivizes the 
growth of domestic companies with the capacity to invest abroad, boosting domestic 
investment overseas and therefore gross capital outflows. This is true for high-income 
countries. However, for low-income economies, institutional quality is negative and 
insignificant. When controlling for capital account openness (Table 8), governance turns out to 
be negative and significant, which indicates that in poorer economies there may be a 
crowding-out effect. As institutional quality improves, domestic investors may decide to invest 
                                                                          
7. There are good reasons to believe that push factors do not face endogeneity issues. 
8. Indeed, Pesaran´s CD test rejects the null hypothesis of spatial independence. 
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in their own country instead of abroad, restricting capital outflows. But, as the economy 
becomes richer, policymakers should expect higher capital outflows when there is better 
governance9. 
Turning to control variables, country specific variables are key drivers of gross capital 
inflows (CI), as shown in Table 7. Countries with sounder economic fundamentals, reflected in 
higher GDP growth and lower public and external debt, attract more capital flows. These 
results are in line with those published in recent papers10.Regarding gross capital outflows 
(CO), a worsening of economic fundamentals in the reporting country, such as the increase of 
the perception of sovereign risk, leads to higher capital outflows, as expected. Finally, we find 
a significant non-linear effect of credit to GDP on both gross capital inflows and outflows. A 
higher level of financial integration has a positive effect on attracting foreign capital flows in 
high income and low and middle-income countries. However, this positive effect disappears 
and becomes negative for high levels of credit to GDP (158% in high income economies and 
70% in low and middle income economies) since these high levels might incentivize the 
creation of bubbles and future crises.  
Global factors are also relevant to explain gross capital flow patterns. While the 
coefficient estimates of world growth has the expected positive sign, an increase in global risk 
(measured by the VIX) reduces gross capital inflows and outflows for all income countries11. 
More specifically, global risk is highly correlated with periods of “stop”-a decline in gross 
capital inflows and “retrenchment”, a decrease in gross capital outflows (Forbes, 2012). 
Finally, a lower interest rate in the United Stated tends to boost capital flows into emerging 
economies but also into other advanced economies since investors will look for alternative 
safe assets with higher returns.  
As a robustness check, we estimate a similar model controlling for financial 
openness and we get very similar estimates. Table 8 reports these results. Financial openness 
is positive and significant, which points out that capital controls mitigate both gross capital 
inflows and gross capital outflows. Regarding governance, the sign of coefficient estimates do 
not vary. Nevertheless, the coefficient of institutional quality for gross capital outflows 
becomes significant and negative in low and middle-income economies. In these countries, 
an improvement in institutional quality reduces gross capital outflows. As pointed out, 
domestic investors may prefer to invest in their own country instead of abroad when their 
institutional domestic conditions improve. Finally, we run an additional specification. We 
estimate the same regression as equation 1, using annual data. This regression allows us to 
demonstrate that our results are robust to annual data and R-squared is higher than using 
quarterly data, as shown in Table 9. Capital flows are less sensitive to global factors due to 
the lack of inertia of these control variables and their high volatility. This is consistent with the 
fact that push factors can better explain short run movements whereas country specific 
variables matter more in the long run. Our main results are robust to this new specification. 
3.1.3 DECOMPOSING BY COMPONENTS 
Do institutional variables affect the three categories of capital flows in the same way? The 
literature points out that the drivers of different types of flows differ. Whereas FDI tends to be 
                                                                          
9. These results are robust when GDP per capita in 1996 is controlled for. 
10. See Alberola, Erce and Serena (2012), and Fratzscher (2012). Broner et al (2013) highlight the prociclacity of gross 
capital flows. Alberola et al (2012) find that gross capital inflows are “positively associated to higher ratings and GDP 
growth, and negatively correlated with the current account”. 
11. Alberola et al (2012) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014) report similar results.  
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associated with a long-term relationship, portfolio and other investment flows are said to be 
more sensitive to domestic conditions. Therefore, a more detailed analysis is necessary, 
focusing on the differences between specific components.  
Table 10 shows the results decomposed by type of instrument. What we observe is 
that our main results are chiefly driven by the behavior of FDI for both gross capital inflows 
and gross capital outflows for all income countries, and by portfolio flows in advanced 
economies. It is easily understandable that institutional quality is a likely determinant of FDI 
inflows. First, sound governance is associated with a good business environment, which 
should attract more FDI. Second, corruption tends to increase investment costs and reduce 
the net present value of investment. With respect to capital outflows, a sound institutional 
framework incentivizes a market-friendly environment, boosting the creation of multinationals 
that will invest in their own country but also abroad. Therefore, foreign direct outflows are 
positively associated with the institutional quality index, as well as other investment and 
portfolio flows in high-income countries.  
What we find most interesting is the differential effect of institutional quality on FDI 
depending on the level of income. While institutional quality is a key determinant to attract FDI 
from foreign investors in low-income countries, it is insignificant in high-income countries. 
According to the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 2001), FDI can be explained by ownership 
advantages-related to acquisition of strategic assets and efficiency gains-, location 
advantages-explained by access to resources and to markets and cost motives- and 
internalization factors-due to uncertainty and incomplete contracts. A possible explanation is 
that location factors are a decisive determinant in less developed economies whereas specific 
advantages (technology, specialized human capital or know-how) are more common drivers 
to explain FDI patterns in more developed economies. Location advantages include resources 
endowment, lower labor costs and institutional degree of development in host countries. FDI 
investors might discriminate among developing countries according to their institutional 
quality, as they tend to invest more in countries with credible and sound institutions while 
poor governance will deter inward FDI. This behavior is consistent with the economic theory 
as poor institutions increase negotiation and enforcement costs. As a result, agents prefer 
locations where their institutional framework facilitates the development of their firm specific 
advantages. This is in line with the results of Buchanan et al (2012), Daude and Stein (2007) 
and Busse and Hefeker (2007) which provide evidence that FDI inflows are positively 
associated to institutional quality. Moreover, sound institutions reduce FDI volatility. 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002) also show that institutions have a positive impact on foreign 
direct outflows for relatively developed economies. They point out that there are “diminishing 
returns” to institutional improvements: the poorer the economy, the higher the impact of 
governance on attracting FDI flows.  
3.1.4 DEALING WITH ENDOGENEITY 
Even if the use of lagged variables for pull drivers of capital flows and the introduction of 
country dummies mitigate endogeneity issues, it is of interest to carry an endogeneity 
exercise. We use a sub-sample to assess the relevance of the potential bias of OLS estimates 
and to determine a causal relationship between institutional drivers and capital flows. Indeed, 
we need to address reverse causation as higher capital inflows might encourage 
governments to implement reforms and to improve institutional standards. In addition, 
institutional estimates can be based on a qualitative assessment, influenced by the amount of 
inflows received. Capital flows and institutional quality may also be determined by an omitted 
variable. Therefore, we complement our analysis with instrumental variable models.  
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To do so, we need to find an appropriate instrument, relevant and exogenous. As 
stressed by Bazzi and Clemens (2013), in order to avoid invalid or weak instruments, one 
needs to account for well-known published results to show that instrumental variables are 
based on a sound theoretical framework and to test their validity. As an instrumental variable, 
we use settler mortality rates from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000 and 2001), a 
broadly used instrument for institutional quality. Acemoglu et al argue that institutions can be 
determined by European colonization strategy, driven by two factors: the disease environment 
facing Europeans and the contemporary indigenous population density. European settlers 
moved to countries with favorable health conditions and established political and economic 
institutions very similar to European institutions. On the contrary, in areas where Europeans 
faced high mortality rates, colonizers were more likely to set up extractive institutions. They 
also note that the local population density is an important factor to determine today´s 
institutions. The lower the population density, the higher the probability of developing sound 
institutions. The probability of capturing local population to do hard work is higher in densely 
populated areas. On the contrary, in areas less populated, settlers had to move there and 
establish sound institutions. Therefore, mortality rates of European settlers in 1500 are a valid 
instrument for property rights institutions. Alfaro et al (2008) used as well the log of European 
settler mortality rates as an instrument for institutions. 
Notice that other potential instrumental variables have been excluded. We decide not 
to use the origin of a country´s legal system because it is found to be a weak instrument. La 
Porta et al (1997) show that contractual institutions are largely influenced by the origin of a 
country´s legal system. English legal system countries tend to protect property rights better 
than countries with a French legal tradition. However, Acemoglu et al argue that is a poor 
instrument for institutional quality. Bazzi and Clemens criticize that “legal origins” have been 
used as an instrument for different endogenous variables in the growth literature and 
conclude that “instrumentation can be valid in at least one of these studies, and at worst 
none”. Similarly, ethnic fragmentation from Easterly and Levine (1997) is a good proxy for 
political stability but not for institutional quality.  
Table 11 reports IV models using only the log of European settler mortality as an 
instrument for institutional quality. To do so, we use a sub-sample of 25 countries due to the lack 
of available data for the rest of countries. In panel A, we present the two-stage least squares 
estimates. As shown in column 1 to 6, an improvement in the institutional quality index has a 
causal effect on most types of capital flows. Indeed, one standard deviation in institutional quality 
increases 0.26 standard deviations in gross capital inflows and 0.22 in gross capital outflows, 0.19 
in FDI inflows, 0.25 in other investment, 0.35 in FDI outflows and 0.15 in other investment outflows 
in terms of GDP. Nevertheless, it seems that there is no a causal link between institutions and 
portfolio flows for this sub-sample since it turns out to be not significant12.  
The first stage results (panel B) show that the settler mortality rate is a significant 
correlate of institutional quality at the 1% confidence level. Regression diagnostics are shown 
in panel E. In the first stage regression results, the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification and 
Wald tests, robust to heteroskedasticity, reject their null hypothesis at 95% level, suggesting 
that the instrument used is adequate to identify the equation13. In addition, applying the 
Staiger-Stock rule of thumb, the first stage F statistic is larger than 10, implying that our 
                                                                          
12. However, we fail to reject the null that institutional can be treated as exogenous for portfolio outflows. 
13. What we do is to test the null hypothesis of weak instruments against the alternative that it is strong. Keibergen and 
Paap proprosed a heteroskedastic-robust statistic, which is the first stage F-statistic, that the instruments are zero. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1531 
instrument is not weak and, hence, it is relevant.14. Panel C reports the OLS counterpart 
results using the same sub-sample. The coefficient estimates turn out to be lower but not 
consistent since we reject the null that institutional quality may be treated as exogenous 
except in the estimation of other investment outflows used as a dependent variable15. 
Comparing between IV and OLS estimates in the sub-sample used in the endogeneity 
exercise, we conclude that the qualitative endogeneity bias of OLS estimates is not so 
important since the sign of IV and OLS models do not change. Even if we assume the 
existence of a quantitative bias, we observe that the different sensitivity of types of flows to 
institutional quality does not vary substantially. Indeed, in this sub-sample the IV estimates 
suggest that FDI outflows are the most sensitive flows to institutional quality. The same result 
is obtained in the OLS model, given a lower magnitude.  
As a robustness check, we estimate the same model of panel A using a limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) method. Recent research suggests LIML performs 
better in the presence of weak instruments (Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner 2004). Fuller´s 
LIML estimates using a constant of 1 are reported in Panel D, which is the best unbiased 
estimator. The estimates are almost equal than in the case of 2sls.  
From this endogeneity exercise, we conclude that the qualitative endogeneity bias of 
IV estimates is not as relevant as expected since the signs of IV and OLS models do not 
change significantly. Even if we assume the existence of a quantitative bias, we observe that 
the different sensitivity of different flows is partially maintained when comparing IV and OLS 
estimates of the sub-sample analyzed. In addition, the main interest of this analysis is to focus 
on the significance and the sign of the institutional coefficient estimates. Nevertheless, further 
research on IV would be interesting. 
3.2 Changes in institutional quality 
3.2.1 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Institutional quality does matter to explain gross capital flows. But, are the different 
dimensions of governance equally relevant, or are some institutional features more significant 
for investors? To discriminate among different aspects of institutional quality, we modify our 
baseline model, introducing the six different indicators that affect governance. To do so, we 
estimate the following equation:  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵᇱܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶᇱ݌ݑ݈݈݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷᇱ݌ݑݏ݄݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧											ሺ2ሻ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	 ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ሼܥܫ௜௧; ܥ ௜ܱ௧; ܫ݂݀݅௜௧; ܫ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋௜௧; ܫ݋݅݊ݒ௜௧; ܱ݂݀݅௜௧; ܱ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋௜௧; ܱ݋݅݊ݒ௜௧ሽ 
And the vector ߚଵᇱ  reports the estimates of the six “backward demeaned” 
governance indicators of the World Bank (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption), which 
capture changes in the different aspects of institutional quality. ߚ଴	is the constant term; 
݌ݑ݈݈݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ and ݌ݑݏ݄݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ are the vectors that include domestic and global factors, 
which affect capital flows. The main interest is on the sign of the vector of the coefficients 
                                                                          
14. Staiger and Stock (1997) advocate the use of the first stage F statistic to investigate the strength of the instruments 
as there is a close correspondence between the expected value of the first-stage F-statistic and bias of the IV estimator, 
relative to the bias of the OLS estimator. These tests deal with weak instruments issues, which happen when the 
correlations between the endogenous regressors and the excluded instruments are non zero but small. 
15. To do so, we run an endogeneity test under the null hypothesis that institutional quality can actually be treated as exogenous. 
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estimates of ߚଵᇱ  in order to account for the different aspects of institutional quality. We include 
a country fixed specific effect, 	ߤ௜,	and a time fixed effect, ߬௧, as in the equation of Section 3.1. 
3.2.2 MAIN RESULTS 
Table 12 presents the outcome decomposed by different dimensions of institutional quality. 
Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality are the institutional variables with the most 
explanatory power. These two dimensions of governance measure the government´s ability to 
implement adequate and credible policies. However, the former is oriented to the quality and 
independence of the public sector whereas the latter focuses on the policies that affect the 
private sector. Indeed, gross capital inflows (CI) are positively associated with Government 
Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality for the whole sample and for the sub-sample of high-
income countries. However, while Government Effectiveness seems to be a key driver in high-
income countries, Regulatory Quality is more relevant in low and middle-income countries. 
This implies that foreign agents invest more capital in countries with a sound policy and better 
quality public services, whereas the use of discretionary power might deter capital flows. 
Nevertheless, in the case of low-income countries, Regulatory Quality seems to be the 
institutional driver of gross capital inflows, which is also a variable related to the ability of 
government to implement sound policies but focusing more on private sector enhancement. 
This result suggests that foreign investors might discriminate in favor of countries with sound 
market-friendly policies when investing in poorer countries. Behaving cautiously, they will 
prefer to invest in countries with better bank supervision, few price controls and a perception 
of low burden of bureaucracy. Moreover, foreign investors will also benefit from the strength 
of local firms in host countries.  
With regards to gross capital outflows (CO), they are positively associated with 
Government Effectiveness for all countries and high-income countries. A lower burden of 
bureaucracy and a better quality of public services not only have a positive influence on 
foreign investors (CI), but also on domestic agents interested in investing abroad (CO). An 
improvement in indicators related to the political process, civil liberties, political rights and the 
quality of public service provision positively affects domestic agents investing abroad. It is 
easily understandable that a better quality of bureaucracy and the respect of civil liberties 
improve the business environment, and, hence, the investment of domestic agents abroad. 
Nevertheless, Government Effectiveness has the opposite effect in low and middle-income 
countries. Domestic investors might decide to retrench capital to invest in their country of 
residence when the credibility and quality of the public sector improve. In addition, political 
stability is negatively correlated, which illustrates that an improvement in crime rates or in 
domestic violence leads to a reduction of capital outflows. Moreover, the coefficient of 
political stability seems to be driven by low and middle-income country patterns. This can be 
explained by a shift in the decision-making of investors, who prefer to invest internally instead 
of abroad when some institutional requirements are met. However, as the economy becomes 
richer, this effect fades. Control variables have the expected sign and are robust to this new 
specification.  
Finally, capital flows are not affected by Voice and Accountability. Therefore, foreign 
agents are more interested in specific market friendly policies and in government credibility 
than in civil rights or the type of government in the countries in which they invest. This 
accords with the strand of the literature that argues that there is no a clear causal effect 
between democracy and growth. 
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3.2.3 DECOMPOSING BY COMPONENTS 
To account for the role of institutional quality in explaining the behavior of foreign and 
domestic agents, we analyze the impact of changes in the six different dimensions of 
governance on the different types of capital flows. As before, our results are mainly driven by 
the relevance of Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality. While portfolio and FDI 
inflows are sensitive to changes in Regulatory Quality, Government Effectiveness affects 
portfolio and foreign direct investment outwards. Table 13 in Appendix provides these results.  
What is more interesting, though, is a more detailed analysis of the institutional 
drivers of FDI for low-income countries (Table 13). For these economies, inward FDI is 
strongly associated with Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality. Daude and Stein 
(2007) get a similar result: “regulatory quality and governance effectiveness seem to be the 
most relevant governance dimensions”. However, we also find a correlation of FDI with 
Control of Corruption. Investors will invest more money in states with few corruption and 
democracy problems. Wei (2000) confirms the negative effect of corruption on FDI, 
comparing it to an increase in tax rates on multinational firms. Finally, there is no clear 
evidence among scholars on the correlation between democracy and FDI. While some 
analysts provide evidence on the positive effect (Wei, 2000), Li and Resnick (2003) conclude 
that FDI inflows are negatively affected. In our analysis, Voice and Accountability turns out to 
be not significant. By contrast, outward FDI is only negatively affected by an improvement in 
Political Stability.  
3.3 Summing up 
Institutional quality is a significant factor to explain the behavior of both foreign and domestic 
investors. Table 14 summarizes the main results. As hypothesized, an increase in political 
institutions attracts more capital flows and improves domestic conditions, in high-income 
countries, that will enhance the creation of multinationals, more willing to invest abroad. 
Secondly, the most relevant institutional indicator seems to be Government Effectiveness, 
which captures the quality of public services and policy formulation and the government´s 
commitment to such policies, followed by Regulatory Quality. Regulatory Quality only affects 
gross capital inflows, but it plays a key role in low and middle-income countries, which is 
consistent with the fact that foreign investors might discriminate in favor of market-oriented 
governments in poorer economies. We will now focus on our second objective: During 
periods of financial stress, do markets discriminate among economies according to their 
institutions? 
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4 Institutional quality during periods of financial stress 
To assess the extent to which markets discriminate among economies according to their 
institutions, we include a dummy for crisis in our baseline model and interact it with 
institutional quality. Then we distinguish between global and domestic crises. The former 
refers to the Russian and Asian crises (1998-1999) and the global financial crisis (2008-2009). 
Our expanded regression is as follows:  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܫܳ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶᇱ݌ݑ݈݈௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷᇱ݌ݑݏ݄௜௧ ൅ ߚସܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ൅ ߚହܿݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ∗ ܫܳ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߬௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ሺ3ሻ 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁	 ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ሼܥܫ௜௧; ܥ ௜ܱ௧; ܫ݂݀݅௜௧; ܫ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋௜௧; ܫ݋݅݊ݒ௜௧; ܱ݂݀݅௜௧; ܱ݌݋ݎݐ݂݋݈݅݋௜௧; ܱ݋݅݊ݒ௜௧ሽ 
And crisis stands for a dummy that includes banking, currency, and sovereign debt 
crises following Laeven and Valencia (2008 and 2012), ߚହ	reports the estimate of the 
interaction of institutional quality index with crisis. ߚ଴	is the constant term. Country-specific 
indicators and global factors are included in the vectors ݌ݑ݈݈݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧ and	݌ݑݏ݄݂ܽܿݐ݋ݎݏ௜௧, 
respectively. We include a country fixed specific effect,	ߤ௜,	and a time fixed effect, ߬௧, as in the 
equation of Section 3.1. 
Table 15 reports fixed-effect estimates. The signs of institutional quality and the 
significant control variables do not change significantly. As expected, the dummy crisis 
has a negative impact on both gross capital inflows and outflows. Moreover, the 
coefficient of crisis is significant for all countries and for the sub-sample of low and 
middle-income countries. While there is a generalized contraction in both gross capital 
inflows and gross capital outflows, the dynamics vary. All else equal, gross capital inflows 
contract on average more than gross capital outflows during periods of financial crises 
(Forbes (2012) and Broner et al (2013)). That is, capital inflows by foreigners tend to 
decline more than capital outflows by domestic agents during periods of stress. 
However, there is a differential behavior in poorer countries during periods of financial 
stress. Firstly, the intensity of capital flow contraction is higher than in high-income 
countries. Secondly, gross capital outflows tend to contract more than gross capital 
inflows in low and middle-income countries, as shown in Table 15.  
Focusing on the sign of ߚହ, the interaction term between crisis and institutional 
quality, the results suggest that countries with a better institutional framework are likely to 
experience lower capital outflows (or a greater retrenchment) than their counterparts during 
periods of financial stress. This effect is especially relevant in low and middle-income 
countries. This pattern is explained by the behavior of domestic agents investing abroad. 
Investors decide to disinvest and to repatriate funds, as Milessi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) 
stressed when analyzing the global financial crisis. However, our analysis differs mainly in two 
dimensions. First, whereas their results are based solely on the global financial crisis, we 
expand this analysis by including currency, debt and banking crises over 1996- 2012. 
Secondly, our purpose is to analyze the impact of institutional quality on the behavior of gross 
capital flows during periods of crises. Indeed, we find that the “great retrenchment”, a 
decrease in gross capital outflows, tends to be more relevant in economies with sound and 
credible political institutions, at least in low and middle-income economies and in the whole 
sample. This is easily understandable. As investors are very sensitive to uncertainty, they will 
opt to increase their portfolio home bias, leading to a retrenchment towards domestic assets. 
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This trend will be more important if their residence is located in states with a better regulatory 
quality environment and a sound system of protection of property rights and contract 
enforcement. By contrast, we do not appreciate a differential effect for gross capital inflows. 
There is no evidence that a better institutional quality mitigates “sudden stops”, a sharp 
decrease in gross capital inflows. Finally, our results are mainly driven by portfolio and other 
investment outflow patterns. This accords with evidence that shows that other investment 
flows are the most volatile type of flow, followed by other portfolio. All these results are robust 
to the inclusion of capital account openness16.  
To dig deeper into the role played by political institutions during periods of 
shocks, we expand estimation 3, distinguishing between global and domestic crises, the 
former referring to the Russian and Asian crises (1998-1999) and the GFC (2008-2009). 
Table 16 shows that the retrenchment of domestic outflows is relevant in both global and 
domestic crises. However, the estimates suggest that reversal in flows towards domestic 
assets in countries with good institutional quality is larger during global crises than during 
domestic crises for the whole sample. The main reason is that even if capital flows 
behave in a similar way during periods of financial crises, their intensity varies. Domestic 
investors retrench capital flows more intensively during global shocks than domestic 
crises. In this context, countries with less vulnerable political institutions benefit from a 
more intense reversal of capital flows. This accords with Broner et al (2013) who show 
that “capital flows react more strongly during years of global crises that during years of 
domestic crises”. However, in low and middle-income countries, the intensity of capital 
retrenchment is higher during domestic crises than global crises. Finally, we estimate the 
same regression as in equation 3, but taking only into consideration the global financial 
crisis (GFC). As shown in table 17, we get very similar results. The retrenchment of 
capital flows is relevant during the GFC. During this specific period of time, the 
interaction term is also significant for high-income countries, more heavily hit by the 
financial crisis. However, as its coefficient is much lower than in poorer countries, we can 
conclude that institutional quality seems to play a more important role for domestic 
investors in low-income countries during periods of financial crises.  
From this analysis, we can draw two conclusions. First, there is a generalized 
reversal of capital flows during periods of crises, regardless of whether it is a domestic or a 
global crisis. Indeed, crises seem to affect the relation of gross capital flows and their 
determinants in the short term since investors seem to behave in a more cautious way, 
disinvesting their positions abroad. Secondly, political institutions also matter during periods 
of stress. Specifically, domestic investors in countries with a sound institutional framework 
tend to retrench more capital, mitigating the negative effects of declining gross capital inflows. 
Therefore, the real impact on the economy is reduced. This partly accords with Fratzscher’s 
results (2012). He showed that states with “strong macro fundamentals and with good 
institutions experienced smaller outflows (or more capital inflows) during the crisis than 
countries with weak fundamentals and high country risk”. However, our results do not only 
focus on GFC but on different types of crises. In addition, institutional quality seems to be 
more relevant in low and middle-income economies during periods of stress. Finally, there is 
no evidence that better institutional quality might also mitigate “sudden stops”, a sharp 
decrease in gross capital inflows. 
                                                                          
16. These results are provided under request. 
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These results are relevant for policy-makers. The retrenchment in gross capital 
outflows can help cushion financial shocks by reducing the need for a large current account 
adjustment. Indeed, gross capital reversals from domestic investors partially compensates the 
effects of “sudden stops”, the reduction in gross capital inflows, leading to a lower reduction 
in net capital flows, and, therefore, reducing its negative impact on the real economy and on 
the financial requirements of countries.   
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5 Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the institutional drivers of capital flows in a panel data of 56 countries 
over a period of almost twenty years. Our main objective is to answer: How relevant are 
institutions to explain the pattern of flows? And, in periods of financial stress, do markets 
discriminate among economies according to their institutions?  
Our main contribution is that institutional quality matters in the long-term pattern of 
flows and helps us to better understand domestic agents´ behavior during periods of financial 
stress. Indeed, the fixed-effect estimates imply that institutional quality has a positive impact 
on both gross capital inflows and gross capital outflows. As hypothesized, an improvement in 
political institutions attracts more capital flows and boosts domestic conditions in high-
income countries, which in turn enhance the creation of multinationals, more willing to invest 
abroad. However, for low and middle-income economies, institutional quality is negative and 
insignificant for gross capital outflows. When controlling for capital account openness, 
governance turns out to be significant and negative, which indicates that in poorer economies 
domestic investors may decide to invest in their own country instead of abroad, restricting 
capital outflows. But, as the economy becomes richer, policymakers should expect higher 
capital outflows if governance improves. In addition, using a sub-sample of 25 countries, the 
IV estimates infer the existence of a causal effect of institutional quality on gross capital flows. 
Moreover, the most relevant institutional indicators seem to be Government 
Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality, which capture the government´s ability to implement 
sound and credible policies. While the former is oriented to the quality of public services and 
policy formulation and the government´s commitment to such policies, the latter refers to 
private sector enhancement policies. Government Effectiveness has a positive impact on both 
gross capital inflows and outflows. Therefore, a lower burden of bureaucracy and better 
quality public services not only have a positive influence on foreign investors, but also on 
domestic agents interested in investing abroad. On the contrary, the use of discretionary 
power might deter capital flows. Regulatory Quality also plays a key role in explaining gross 
capital inflows, especially in low and middle-income countries. By contrast, democratic 
aspects do not seem to play a significant role in explaining foreign agents´ investment 
decisions. This result suggests that foreign agents are more interested in specific market 
friendly policies and in government credibility than in civil rights or the type of regime of the 
countries in which they invest. This is in line with the strand of literature that argues that there 
is no clear effect between democracy and growth.  
Our results are mainly driven by the behavior of FDI and portfolio flows. What is more 
interesting is the differential impact of institutional quality on FDI depending on the level of 
income. While governance is a key driver of FDI in low and middle-income countries, it has no 
impact on high-income countries. The underlying explanation lies in the determinants of FDI. 
In less developed economies, location factors- access to natural resources, lower labor 
costs- play an important role. Among these location factors, recent research (Dunning, 2006) 
highlights the relevance of institutional development. Indeed, we find that inward FDI in low 
and middle-economies is associated with better Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality and Control of Corruption. By contrast, FDI in more developed economies is mainly 
affected by specific advantages, such as technology advantages and specialized human 
capital.  
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Turning to the role of institutional variables during periods of crises, we find that 
political institutions also matter when explaining the behavior of domestic agents investing 
abroad. More specifically, countries with a better institutional framework are likely to 
experience lower capital outflows (or a greater retrenchment) than their counterparts during 
periods of financial stress, regardless of whether it is a domestic or a global crisis. This 
pattern is explained by the behavior of domestic investors. As investors are very sensitive to 
uncertainty, they will opt to increase their portfolio home bias, leading to a “retrenchment” of 
capital invested abroad towards domestic assets. This trend is more important if their 
residence is located in states with sound and credible political institutions and a better system 
of protection of property rights. By contrast, there is no clear evidence that institutional quality 
plays a differential role during periods of crises to explain gross capital inflow patterns. 
Therefore, institutional factors incentivize the build-up of external assets in high-income 
countries, by promoting larger capital outflows, in normal times. But, they also facilitate the 
repatriation of such assets in periods of crises. The retrenchment of gross capital outflows 
can counteract the negative effect of declining gross capital inflows, cushioning financial 
shocks by reducing the need for a large current account adjustment. Therefore, the impact on 
the real economy and on the financial requirements of countries will be lower.  
To attract more gross capital flows or to cushion financial shocks, policymakers can 
improve institutional quality and, in particular, Government Effectiveness and Regulatory 
Quality. In order to increase the quality of public service and bureaucracy, governments 
should focus on strengthening competitive pressures, applying results oriented to budgeting 
and pursuing innovative practices linked to efficiency. Transparency, openness and increasing 
the degree of independence of public institutions are key factors to boost people´s trust in 
government credibility and in its policies. Reducing administrative burdens and integrating 
better regulation policies aimed at boosting private sector activity should also be taken into 
consideration. However, additional work is necessary. Specifically, empirical research on the 
impact of institutional quality on the volatility of capital flows could bring interesting results. In 
addition, an analysis of a sample selection issue is also a fruitful line of investigation. Finally, 
another line of research could focus on the relative importance of institutional and economic 
factors in determining capital flows.   
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APPENDIX 
5.1 Countries analyzed 
 
 
5.2 Data Appendix 
5.2.1 CAPITAL FLOWS 
Capital flows data are taken from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. The variables 
used as capital inflows are Direct Investment in the Reporting Economy (line78 bed), Portfolio 
Investment Liabilities (line 78 bgd), Other Investment Liabilities (line 78 bid). Then we 
aggregate them to calculate gross capital inflows. Analogously, capital outflows are calculated 
using Direct Investment Abroad (line78 bfd), Portfolio Investment Assets (line 78 bfd), Other 
Investment Assets (line 78 bwd). Gross capital outflows are the sum of these three 
components.  
5.2.2 WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS 
Kraufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004) define Worldwide Governance indicators as follows: 
1. Voice and Accountability (VA)-“capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country´s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media”. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV)-“capturing perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism”. 
Table 1
non-OECD (7) Asia (6) Africa (1) Eastern Europe (7) Latin America (8)
Australia* Japan Cyprus China* South Africa* Bulgaria Argentina*
Austr ia Korea* Estonia India* Latvia Brazil*
Belgium Luxembourg Hong Kong* Indonesia* Lithuania Colombia*
Canada* Netherland Israel Thailand* Turkey Chile*
Czech Republic New Zealand* Malta* Malaysia* Poland Mexico*
Denmark Norway Singapore* Philippines Romania Peru*
Finland Portugal Slovenia Russia Uruguay*
France* Slovakia Venezuela*
Germany Spain
Greece Sweden
Hungary Switzer land
Iceland United Kingdom*
Ireland United States*
Italy
This table presents the 56 countries of our sample. It is divided into groups according to their income levels as classified by the World Bank of July 2010
In addition, * denotes the countries used in the IV subsample. 
 List of countries. Classification by Region and Income (WTI)
High income countries (34) (GNI pc> $11,906) Low and middle income countries (22) ($976<GNI pc< $11,905)
OECD (27)
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3. Government Effectiveness (GE)-“capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government´s 
commitment to such policies.” 
4. Regulatory Quality (RQ)-“capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development.” 
5. Rule of Law (RL) - “capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”. 
6. Control of Corruption (CC) - “capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
capture of the state by elites and private interests”. 
5.2.3 INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INDEX 
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Figure 3: Institutional quality index. 2012 
Source: Author´s elaboration
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Figure 4: Evolution of Institutional quality index
Argentina
Estonia
Greece
Korea
Source: Author´s elaboration
Table 2
Principal component regression
Dependent var iables CI CO Ifdi Iportfolio Ioinv Ofdi Oportfolio Ooinv
Component
c1 0.23*** 0.15** 0.28*** 0.20** -0.01 0.25*** 0.11* 0.09
[0.072] [0.060] [0.048] [0.091] [0.081] [0.063] [0.058] [0.060]
c2 -0.19** -0.08 -0.01 -0.18 -0.09 -0.24** -0.14 -0.00
[0.084] [0.083] [0.133] [0.117] [0.112] [0.115] [0.089] [0.079]
c3 -0.10 -0.36** 0.01 -0.22 0.18* 0.06 -0.17 -0.25**
[0.142] [0.136] [0.124] [0.175] [0.099] [0.104] [0.136] [0.103]
c4 0.06 -0.27*** -0.06 -0.07 -0.00 -0.08 0.13 -0.28**
[0.091] [0.096] [0.164] [0.099] [0.106] [0.094] [0.145] [0.118]
c5 0.29** 0.05 0.35** -0.16 0.32 -0.06 -0.28 0.22
[0.122] [0.147] [0.152] [0.164] [0.191] [0.157] [0.189] [0.140]
c6 0.40* 0.36** -0.16 0.14 0.28 0.33** 0.69*** -0.07
[0.225] [0.161] [0.185] [0.210] [0.202] [0.154] [0.143] [0.141]
Other control variables included
Observations 2,992 2,996 3,016 3,017 2,993 3,015 3,008 3,005
R-squared from OLS estimates 0.21 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10
This table presents the results of the principal component regression. The dependent variables are reported for our baseline sample. However, we include the six components, 
stemmed from a principal component analysis of the six governance indicators, controlling for push factors (GDP growth, spread long term interes, public debt, gross external 
debt, reserves GDP, credit GDP and squared  credit GDP) and push factors (vix variation, world GDP growth and US 10 year Treasury bill rates). The data covers 56 countries
over the 1996-2012 period.Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **  p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
All countries
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5.2.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table 3
Correlation matrix
Gdp growth Spread interesPublic debt GDExternal debt GDReserves GDCredit GDP  Credit GDP^2 VIX World gdp growUS10yanual IQ index VA PS GE RQ RL CC
Gdp growth 1
Spread interest lt -0.1275 1
Public debt GDP -0.2063 0.1258 1
External debt GDP -0.0843 -0.0733 -0.0956 1
Reserves GDP 0.1685 -0.0778 -0.1256 -0.0797 1
Credit GDP -0.2278 -0.3269 0.1147 0.2218 0.0003 1
 Credit GDP^2 -0.2222 -0.2242 0.0636 0.187 -0.0329 0.9469 1
VIX -0.3454 0.1489 -0.0253 0.0008 0.0023 0.0266 0.0366 1
World gdp growth 0.5163 -0.0803 -0.0031 -0.0249 -0.027 -0.0741 -0.0792 -0.6572 1
US10yanual 0.2059 0.0039 -0.1219 -0.0869 -0.1158 -0.2183 -0.2163 -0.298 0.3511 1
IQ index -0.2136 -0.4406 0.1336 0.2721 -0.1015 0.6293 0.496 -0.022 0.0053 -0.0423 1
VA 0.0694 -0.0421 -0.1034 0.0118 -0.0256 -0.1767 -0.1367 -0.0515 0.05 0.0447 0.0951 1
PS 0.1463 -0.0321 -0.2209 -0.0092 0.0914 -0.2226 -0.1828 0.0157 0.0276 0.0348 0.0049 0.4252 1
GE 0.2008 -0.1468 -0.2439 -0.1974 0.3327 -0.1389 -0.1519 -0.009 0.0285 0.0305 -0.0374 0.1736 0.2797 1
RQ -0.014 -0.4554 -0.1058 -0.0072 0.0111 0.1007 0.0149 0.0057 -0.0002 -0.0112 0.3092 0.2369 0.1692 0.3977 1
RL 0.0258 -0.3091 -0.1871 0.0489 0.2199 0.1128 0.0974 0.0076 -0.0111 -0.0443 0.3005 0.4605 0.5086 0.4251 0.4782 1
CC 0.1547 -0.0468 -0.1273 0.007 0.1289 -0.2142 -0.1891 -0.0296 0.0603 0.1117 0.0302 0.3939 0.2852 0.4168 0.2602 0.453 1
This table reports correlation structure for all variables employed in most models analyzed. The data covers 56 countries over 1996-2012. Institutional variables are reported VA (Voice and Accountability), PS (Political Stability); GE (Government Effectiveness),  RQ
 (Regulatory Quality), RL (Rule of Law), CC (Control of Corruption), after the transformation explained in 2.2. IQ index stands for institutional quality index. 
Table 4
Control variables and information sources
Variable Definition Sources
Pull factors
GDP growth Domestic gdp growth IMF, national accounts
Spread interest rates lt Spread between each country long term interest rates and US long term interest rates Datastream
Public debt GDP Public debt to gdp IMF, national accounts
External debt GDP Gross external debt to gdp Datastream
Current account Current account to gdp IMF, national accounts
Reserves GDP Ratio of total sum of reserves including gold to gdp IMF
Credit gdp Private credit to gdp IMF, national accounts
Credit GDP^2 Squared term of credit to GDP IMF
Push factors
VIX Annual Chicago Board Option Exchange Market volatility index CBOE
Worlg gdp growth World gdp growth IMF, WEO
US 10y annual US 10-year Treasury Bills interest rate Bloomberg
Source: Author´s elaboration
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5.2.5 CRISIS YEARS 
Table 5: Crisis years 
High income countries  Years 
Austria 2008-2012 
Belgium 2008-2012 
Czech Republic 1996 
Canada 2008 
Denmark 2008, 2009 
France 2008-2012 
Germany 2008-2012 
Greece 2008-2012 
Hungary 2008-2012 
Iceland 2008-2010 
Ireland 2008-2012 
Italy 2008-2012 
Japan 1997 
Korea 1997, 1998, 2008 
Luxembourg 2008-2012 
Netherlands 2008-2012 
Portugal 2008-2012 
Slovakia 1998 
Slovenia 2008-2011 
Spain 2008-2012 
Sweden  2008, 2009 
Switzerland 2008, 2009 
United Kingdom 2007-2009 
United states 2007-2011 
Low and middle income countries  Years 
Argentina 2001, 2002, 2007 
Brazil 1999, 2002 
Bulgaria 1996 
China 1998 
Colombia 1998 
India 2008, 2009 
Indonesia 1997, 1998, 1999 
Latvia 2008-2012 
Malaysia 1997, 1998 
Mexico 2008 
Philippines 1997, 1998 
Poland 2008 
Romania 1996 
Russia 1998, 2008, 2009 
South Africa 2008 
Thailand 1997, 1998 
Turkey 1996, 2000, 2001 
Uruguay 2002, 2003 
Venezuela 2002, 2004,2010 
Source: Author´s elaboration 
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Variables mean median max min
CI 6.020421 1.855524 421.2789 -225.357
CO 5.5386 1.151574 411.5301 -242.8225
Iportfolio 1.981412 0.4216403 263.9653 -259.3751
Ifdi 2.181401 0.6521972 357.0399 -14.68249
Ioinv 1.822672 0.5123302 196.8226 -126.1844
Ofdi 1.901671 0.2696054 336.5611 -15.06009
Oportfolio 1.742563 0.287113 243.1358 -240.9393
Ooinv 1.879424 0.3838827 265.7225 -132.9283
Institutional quality index 0.0028539 0.29763 3.502515 -6.050933
Voice and Accountability 0.76934 0.9896075 1.82637 -1.681624
Political Stability 0.3950872 0.6478677 1.668068 -2.39011
Government Effectiveness 0.9477637 0.9934573 2.429651 -1.189068
Regulatory Quality 0.9289314 1.044137 2.247344 -1.608095
Rule of Law 0.7980568 0.9291674 1.99964 -1.68562
Control of Corruption. 0.8477202 0.8569242 2.585616 -1.240667
CI 8.817042 2.690819 421.2789 -225.357
CO 8.378463 2.015113 411.5301 -242.8225
Iportfolio 3.02139 0.7951693 263.9653 -259.3751
Ifdi 3.017312 0.6789804 357.0399 -14.68249
Ioinv 2.713497 0.8904093 196.8226 -126.1844
Ofdi 2.928078 0.5241957 336.5611 -15.06009
Oportfolio 2.676353 0.7209999 243.1358 -240.9393
Ooinv 2.772747 0.6192296 265.7225 -132.9283
Institutional quality index 1.448431 1.55197 3.502515 -1.505417
Voice and Accountability 1.177658 1.263639 1.82637 -0.369701
Political Stability 0.8720912 0.9833883 1.668068 -1.623045
Government Effectiveness 1.452968 1.587448 2.429651 0.0586451
Regulatory Quality 1.354531 1.353447 2.247344 0.3053589
Rule of Law 1.357517 1.450227 1.99964 0.1528877
Control of Corruption. 1.437454 1.494094 2.585616 -0.2542657
CI 1.386197 1.206128 14.95719 -9.651725
CO 0.756557 0.5157577 10.98381 -7.217114
Iportfolio 0.2642398 0.1703245 5.767459 -7.310705
Ifdi 0.794494 0.6239136 8.588666 -1.914478
Ioinv 0.3405922 0.2308996 11.45121 -11.22121
Ofdi 0.1977159 0.0815608 4.158336 -4.398902
Oportfolio 0.1839683 0.0509536 4.64746 -2.330623
Ooinv 0.3861864 0.2074898 8.205899 -8.154372
Institutional quality index -2.352071 -2.462138 1.386763 -6.050933
Voice and Accountability 0.1041667 0.1822989 1.244145 -1.681624
Political Stability -0.4009237 -0.3612384 1.057762 -2.39011
Government Effectiveness 0.1046927 0.0347307 1.277847 -1.189068
Regulatory Quality 0.2187029 0.2669109 1.644733 -1.608095
Rule of Law -0.1355547 -0.1596369 1.366822 -1.68562
Control of Corruption. -0.1364105 -0.236962 1.561873 -1.240667
This table reports descriptive statistics for capital flows and institutional indicators employed. It covers 56
countries over 1996-2012. Capital flows are normalized by the reporting country´s gdp.  Results for all the
 sample, as well as separately by income are reported.  The Data Appendix provides variable definitions
 and sources. 
Table 6
 Descr iptive statistics
All countries
High income
Low and middle income
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5.3 Panel data estimates 
5.3.1 DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL FLOWS. INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INDEX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7
Panel data estimates. Gross capital flows
Dependent var iables CI CO CI CO CI CO
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Institutional quality index 0.187** 0.063 0.228** 0.462*** 0.289*** -0.081
[0.079] [0.063] [0.114] [0.112] [0.090] [0.073]
CONTROL VARIABLES
PULL FACTORS
Gdp growth 0.031*** 0.006 0.026** 0.008 0.025** 0.004
[0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]
Spread interest lt 0.005 0.018** -0.033 0.013 0.015** 0.014*
[0.007] [0.008] [0.035] [0.037] [0.007] [0.007]
Public debt GDP -0.007*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 0.003
[0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
External debt GDP -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.011*** -0.007**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003]
Reserves GDP -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.010* 0.005
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.011]
Credit GDP 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.015** 0.013
[0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
 Credit GDP^2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PUSH FACTORS
VIX -0.047*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.029***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009]
World gdp growth 0.093 0.073 0.082 0.102* 0.117 0.026
[0.065] [0.061] [0.067] [0.057] [0.073] [0.075]
US10yannual -0.212*** -0.153* -0.200* -0.185* -0.208** -0.099
[0.075] [0.081] [0.102] [0.097] [0.101] [0.101]
Observations 2,720 2,729 1,547 1,552 1,173 1,177
R-squared from OLS estimates 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.09
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are  capital Inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP 
and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country fixed effects 
and year and quarter dummies. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately by income.The data covers 56 countries over the
1996-2012 period. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are reported in parantheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the
 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
All countr ies High income Low and Middle Income 
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5.3.2 DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL FLOWS.ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8
Robustness check. Financial openness index. Gross capital flows
Dependent variables CI CO CI CO CI CO
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Institutional quality index 0.186** 0.015 0.253** 0.472*** 0.273** ‐0.149**
[0.083] [0.066] [0.108] [0.121] [0.103] [0.066]
CONTROL VARIABLES
PULL FACTORS
Gdp growth 0.031*** 0.005 0.027** 0.009 0.025** 0.005
[0.009] [0.008] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009]
Spread interest lt 0.004 0.017** ‐0.032 0.015 0.015** 0.014**
[0.006] [0.007] [0.031] [0.033] [0.007] [0.007]
Public debt GDP ‐0.005* ‐0.001 0.000 0.003 ‐0.002 0.004
[0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
External debt GDP ‐0.003*** ‐0.003*** ‐0.003*** ‐0.002*** ‐0.011*** ‐0.008**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003]
Reserves GDP 0.001 0.003 0.007* 0.006* ‐0.010* 0.005
[0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.011]
Credit GDP 0.007 0.003 0.018*** 0.012* 0.015* 0.012
[0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.009]
 Credit GDP^2 ‐0.000** ‐0.000** ‐0.000*** ‐0.000** ‐0.000* ‐0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Capital account openness index 0.011 0.066** 0.149** 0.184** 0.017 0.074
[0.043] [0.032] [0.063] [0.072] [0.052] [0.046]
PUSH FACTORS
VIX ‐0.046*** ‐0.034*** ‐0.040*** ‐0.038*** ‐0.053*** ‐0.030***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009]
World gdp growth 0.093 0.072 0.081 0.100* 0.117 0.027
[0.066] [0.062] [0.068] [0.057] [0.073] [0.074]
US10yannual ‐0.208*** ‐0.145* ‐0.193* ‐0.172* ‐0.209** ‐0.100
[0.077] [0.083] [0.105] [0.100] [0.101] [0.101]
Observations 2,677 2,686 1,504 1,509 1,173 1,177
R-squared 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.09
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are  capital Inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP 
and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country fixed effects 
and year dummies. We control for a new variables: capital account openness index (Chinn-Ito Financial Index).The results are reported for all the 
sample, as well as separately by income.The annual data covers 56 countries over 1996-2012. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are reported in 
parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
All countr ies High income Low and Middle Income 
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Table 9
Robustness check. Annual data. Gross capital flows
Dependent var iables CI CO CI CO CI CO
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
Institutional quality index 0.50** 0.52* 0.70* 1.01** 0.70 0.08
[0.219] [0.283] [0.390] [0.361] [0.419] [0.485]
CONTROL VARIABLES
PULL FACTORS
Gdp growth 0.03* -0.00 0.04** 0.03 0.02 -0.02
[0.018] [0.021] [0.019] [0.021] [0.025] [0.022]
Spread interest lt 0.00 0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.015] [0.016] [0.078] [0.075] [0.014] [0.019]
Public debt GDP -0.01** -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01* -0.00
[0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.004]
External debt GDP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.005]
Reserves GDP 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.03** -0.00
[0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.015] [0.014]
Credit GDP 0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.009] [0.006] [0.013] [0.011] [0.018] [0.016]
 Credit GDP^2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PUSH FACTORS
VIX 0.01 0.01 -0.10*** -0.07** 0.05* 0.03
[0.014] [0.013] [0.032] [0.029] [0.026] [0.024]
World gdp growth 0.07 0.10** -0.23* -0.12 0.13** 0.01
[0.042] [0.039] [0.118] [0.105] [0.053] [0.041]
US10yannual 0.05** 0.05** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.08* -0.13***
[0.020] [0.022] [0.057] [0.059] [0.042] [0.039]
Observations 642 645 363 365 279 280
R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.24
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are  capital Inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP 
and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country fixed effects
and year and quarter dummies. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately by income.The data covers 56 countries over the
1996-2012 period. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are given in parantheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
All countr ies High income Low and Middle Income 
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5.3.3 DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL FLOWS. DECOMPOSING BY COMPONENTS.  
Table 10
Panel data estimates. Capital flows by components. 
Dependent variables Ifdi Iportfolio Ioinv Ofdi Oportfolio Ooinv
Institutional quality index 0.289*** 0.069 -0.006 0.127** 0.089 0.045
[0.044] [0.076] [0.078] [0.055] [0.060] [0.066]
Gdp growth 0.029*** 0.007 0.025*** 0.002 -0.007 0.012
[0.009] [0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008]
Spread interest lt 0.007 -0.017*** 0.021*** -0.015** -0.011 0.025***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Public debt GDP -0.002 -0.004** -0.006*** 0.002 0.002 -0.005**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
External debt GDP 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Reserves GDP 0.010** -0.014** 0.001 0.012*** -0.003 -0.002
[0.004] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Credit GDP 0.002 0.007** -0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
 Credit GDP^2 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VIX -0.015*** -0.046*** -0.025** -0.004 -0.038*** -0.024***
[0.003] [0.009] [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
World gdp growth -0.015 -0.040 0.140*** 0.047 -0.076 0.094**
[0.039] [0.067] [0.050] [0.058] [0.056] [0.046]
US10yannual -0.095* -0.125 -0.150* -0.029 -0.075 -0.145**
[0.052] [0.087] [0.088] [0.083] [0.064] [0.070]
Observations 2,744 2,745 2,721 2,745 2,741 2,733
R-squared 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11
Institutional quality index -0.209 0.365* 0.095 0.323** 0.432*** 0.283**
[0.132] [0.196] [0.170] [0.135] [0.125] [0.139]
Gdp growth 0.020* 0.009 0.024 0.005 -0.006 0.018
[0.010] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Spread interest lt 0.007 -0.030 0.017 -0.034* 0.034 -0.023
[0.025] [0.031] [0.039] [0.017] [0.040] [0.023]
Public debt GDP 0.002 -0.012*** 0.000 0.011*** 0.002 -0.004
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
External debt GDP 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Reserves GDP 0.001 -0.010* 0.003 0.004 -0.009 0.000
[0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
Credit GDP -0.006 0.021*** 0.000 -0.011 0.002 0.008
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005]
 Credit GDP^2 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VIX -0.003 -0.055*** -0.013 0.000 -0.058*** -0.025***
[0.006] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009]
World gdp growth 0.018 -0.122 0.160*** 0.008 -0.119* 0.164***
[0.045] [0.074] [0.060] [0.061] [0.069] [0.051]
US10yannual -0.051 -0.184** -0.097 0.040 -0.174** -0.176*
[0.097] [0.086] [0.101] [0.110] [0.067] [0.089]
Observations 1,551 1,552 1,548 1,552 1,552 1,552
R-squared 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.19
Institutional quality index 0.534*** 0.001 0.084 -0.015 -0.047 -0.030
[0.053] [0.073] [0.081] [0.083] [0.083] [0.073]
Gdp growth 0.026** -0.002 0.024*** 0.001 -0.006 0.007
[0.011] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
Spread interest lt 0.022*** -0.034*** 0.036*** -0.012* -0.027*** 0.025***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Public debt GDP -0.009*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002]
External debt GDP 0.003 0.005 -0.016*** 0.005** 0.007* -0.011***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Reserves GDP 0.015** -0.018** -0.012** 0.030*** 0.007 -0.005
[0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010]
Credit GDP -0.011** 0.004 0.020** 0.001 0.008 0.010
[0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007]
 Credit GDP^2 0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VIX -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.039*** -0.011 -0.012* -0.023***
[0.007] [0.011] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
World gdp growth -0.032 0.067 0.118* 0.103 -0.026 -0.011
[0.062] [0.061] [0.064] [0.062] [0.043] [0.054]
US10yannual -0.147* -0.046 -0.195 -0.130 0.069 -0.099
[0.076] [0.127] [0.124] [0.084] [0.087] [0.096]
Observations 1,193 1,193 1,173 1,193 1,189 1,181
R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.06
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are Capital Inflows by foreign agents decomposed by instruments: foreign direct inflows (Ifdi), portfolio inflows (Iportfolio) and 
other investment (Ioinv) and capital outflows by domestic agents, decomposed by instruments: foreign investment (Ofdi), portfolio (Oportfolio) and other
 investment (Oinv). These variables are normalized by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and by dividing by the standard deviation at
 the country level. All the regressions include country fixed effects and year and quarter dummies. Discroll-Kraay robust standard erros in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
HIGH INCOME
LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME
ALL COUNTRIES
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5.3.4 DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL FLOWS. IV ESTIMATES  
Table 11:
IV estimates
Dependent variables
Panel A: second stage results (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Institutional quality index 0.256*** [0.062] 0.224*** [0.079] 0.192*** [0.060] 0.247*** [0.053] 0.351*** [0.078] 0.147* [0.076]
Gdp growth -0.002 [0.008] -0.003 [0.010] 0.015 [0.012] 0.002 [0.008] -0.018 [0.012] 0.011 [0.011]
Spread interest lt 0.051** [0.022] 0.047*** [0.017] 0.049** [0.023] 0.048** [0.019] 0.005 [0.018] 0.059*** [0.017]
Public debt GDP -0.007* [0.004] 0.008** [0.004] -0.008* [0.005] -0.004 [0.003] 0.009*** [0.003] 0.002 [0.003]
External debt GDP -0.002** [0.001] -0.003** [0.001] -0.001 [0.001] -0.003*** [0.001] -0.001 [0.002] -0.002** [0.001]
Reserves GDP 0.008 [0.005] 0.001 [0.004] 0.007 [0.005] 0.007* [0.004] 0.002 [0.005] 0.004 [0.004]
Credit GDP -0.000 [0.007] 0.004 [0.008] -0.016** [0.007] 0.004 [0.006] -0.024*** [0.007] 0.010 [0.008]
 Credit GDP^2 0.000 [0.000] -0.000 [0.000] 0.000** [0.000] -0.000 [0.000] 0.000** [0.000] -0.000 [0.000]
VIX -0.056*** [0.009] -0.035*** [0.009] -0.009** [0.004] -0.040*** [0.011] 0.003 [0.008] -0.021*** [0.006]
World gdp growth 0.192** [0.075] 0.146** [0.061] 0.067 [0.046] 0.147*** [0.057] 0.135** [0.055] 0.105*** [0.037]
US10yannual -0.241** [0.119] -0.084 [0.122] 0.016 [0.058] -0.215* [0.126] -0.003 [0.096] -0.071 [0.091]
Panel B: first stage results
Log European settler mortality  -1.293*** [0.064] -1.199*** [0.061]  -1.171*** [0.065] -1.239 *** [0.064] -1.172  *** [0.065] -1.199 *** [0.061]
Panel C: OLS Estimates
Institutional quality index 0.03 [0.048] 0.05 [0.057] 0.09* [0.047] 0.12*** [0.041] 0.15*** [0.042] 0.09* [0.057]
Panel D: LIML estimates on Institutional quality index
Fuller LIML (k=1) 0.255*** [0.062] 0.223*** [0.078] 0.192*** [0.060] 0.247*** [0.053] 0.351*** [0.078] 0.147* [0.076]
Panel E: Diagnostics
F test excluded restr ictions 370.68 383.21 327.78 370.5 327.68 383.05
Kleibergen-Paap LM test (p-value) 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.0015 0.007 0.0239 0.007 0.0126 0.1841
Observations 1,183 1,188 1,203 1,184 1,204 1,192
R-squared (IV estimates) 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.13
Panel A reports second stage results of two stage least squares estimates, using as an IV the log settler mortality for institutional quality. Panel B and C report the first stage and the OLS estimates, respectively.
In Panel D, we estimate the effect of institutional quality on capital flows, using Fuller´s limited information maximum likelihood method. Regression diagnostics are shown in Panel E. All regressions include 
a constant and the same control variables than in Panel A, even if not reported. The dependent variables are Gross capital inflows (CI), gross capital outflows (CO), fdi inflows, other investment inflows, fdi outflows
 and other investment outflows,  standardized by countries. Robust to hereroskedasticity , aurocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation standard errors in brackets denoting *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 significance
All countries
CI CO Ifdi Ioinv Ofdi Ooinv
(6)
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5.3.5 CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY. GROSS CAPITAL FLOWS  
 
 
 
Table 12
Panel data estimates decomposing by institutional features. Gross capital flows
Dependent var iables CI CO CI CO CI CO
INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLE
Voice and Accountability 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.14 0.26 0.32
[0.260] [0.204] [0.398] [0.284] [0.322] [0.262]
Political Stability -0.19* -0.24** -0.48*** -0.35** 0.06 -0.06
[0.084] [0.098] [0.165] [0.168] [0.116] [0.143]
Government Effectiveness 0.39** 0.36*** 0.47** 0.66*** -0.12 -0.58**
[0.150] [0.120] [0.224] [0.196] [0.278] [0.279]
Regulatory Quality 0.47*** -0.11 0.46* 0.31 0.72** -0.18
[0.151] [0.155] [0.254] [0.211] [0.289] [0.256]
Rule of Law -0.31 -0.05 -0.53 0.05 -0.40 -0.39
[0.262] [0.287] [0.490] [0.542] [0.300] [0.273]
Control of Corruption 0.09 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.01 -0.08
[0.148] [0.109] [0.234] [0.145] [0.231] [0.195]
CONTROL VARIABLES
PULL FACTORS
Gdp growth 0.03*** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01
[0.010] [0.009] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.009]
Spread interest lt 0.01 0.02** -0.04 -0.00 0.02** 0.01**
[0.006] [0.008] [0.035] [0.037] [0.007] [0.007]
Public debt GDP -0.01*** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
External debt GDP -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.004]
Reserves GDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.01
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.013]
Credit GDP 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.02*** 0.02**
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
 Credit GDP^2 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PUSH FACTORS
VIX -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03***
[0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.009]
World gdp growth 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.11* 0.12 0.03
[0.065] [0.062] [0.066] [0.055] [0.074] [0.076]
US 10 years -0.22*** -0.15* -0.21** -0.19* -0.23** -0.12
[0.075] [0.080] [0.102] [0.096] [0.098] [0.103]
Observations 2,617 2,626 1,499 1,504 1,118 1,122
R-squared(from OLS estimates) 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.11
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are capital Inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized
by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the
regressions include country fixed effects and year dummies. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately 
by income.The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are given  in brackets.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%. 
All countr ies High income Low and Middle income
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5.3.6 CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY. DECOMPOSING BY COMPONENTS. 
 
  
Table 13
Panel data estimates decomposing by institutional features. Capital flows by components
Dependent var iables Ifdi Iportfolio Ioinv Ofdi Oport Ooinv
Voice and Accountability 0.21 -0.34 0.13 0.10 0.26 0.16
[0.228] [0.244] [0.193] [0.202] [0.234] [0.184]
Political Stability -0.09 -0.17 0.00 -0.10 -0.25 -0.08
[0.113] [0.130] [0.089] [0.129] [0.165] [0.091]
Government Effectiveness 0.14 -0.06 0.25 0.53** 0.84*** -0.23
[0.194] [0.257] [0.190] [0.209] [0.172] [0.167]
Regulatory Quality 0.53** 0.49** -0.01 -0.05 0.26 -0.01
[0.205] [0.221] [0.209] [0.211] [0.223] [0.130]
Rule of Law -0.34 0.15 -0.09 -0.27 -0.62** 0.28
[0.299] [0.233] [0.229] [0.295] [0.251] [0.239]
Control of Corruption 0.34 0.14 -0.21 0.07 -0.40** 0.23
[0.247] [0.180] [0.162] [0.162] [0.177] [0.139]
Other control variables included
Observations 2,641 2,642 2,618 2,642 2,638 2,630
R-squared from OLS estimates 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12
Voice and Accountability 0.35 -0.60 0.48 0.42 0.15 0.15
[0.439] [0.400] [0.422] [0.394] [0.486] [0.257]
Political Stability -0.23 -0.37** -0.28 0.31* -0.35 -0.28*
[0.243] [0.178] [0.208] [0.180] [0.218] [0.159]
Government Effectiveness -0.49 0.08 0.42 0.21 1.23*** 0.02
[0.291] [0.322] [0.283] [0.291] [0.307] [0.198]
Regulatory Quality 0.17 1.01*** -0.21 -0.04 0.69* -0.01
[0.393] [0.312] [0.358] [0.392] [0.414] [0.250]
Rule of Law -0.72 0.13 0.23 -0.79 -0.89* 0.64
[0.612] [0.433] [0.468] [0.611] [0.446] [0.391]
Control of Corruption 0.27 0.18 -0.16 0.40 -0.13 0.33**
[0.365] [0.293] [0.186] [0.255] [0.175] [0.161]
Other control variables included
Observations 1,503 1,504 1,500 1,504 1,504 1,504
R-squared from OLS estimates 0.10 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.20
Voice and Accountability 0.36 -0.16 -0.05 0.17 0.19 0.11
[0.246] [0.324] [0.208] [0.280] [0.349] [0.263]
Political Stability -0.08 0.02 0.31*** -0.38*** -0.06 0.14
[0.138] [0.161] [0.090] [0.124] [0.207] [0.132]
Government Effectiveness 0.70** -0.10 -0.61** 0.43 -0.25 -0.70**
[0.275] [0.385] [0.294] [0.288] [0.287] [0.325]
Regulatory Quality 0.70** 0.16 0.60*** 0.06 0.27 0.08
[0.290] [0.277] [0.207] [0.261] [0.396] [0.273]
Rule of Law -0.18 -0.01 -0.54** -0.21 -0.79* -0.16
[0.380] [0.295] [0.233] [0.345] [0.398] [0.350]
Control of Corruption 0.60* -0.09 -0.15 -0.19 -0.48 0.03
[0.349] [0.210] [0.259] [0.241] [0.325] [0.252]
Other control variables included
Observations 1,188 1,188 1,168 1,188 1,184 1,176
R-squared from OLS estimates 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.08 0.07
The dependent variables are Capital Inflows by foreign agents decomposed by instruments: foreign direct inflows (Ifdi), portfolio inflows (Iportfolio) 
and other investment (Ioinv) and capital outflows by domestic agents, decomposed by instruments: foreign investment (Ofdi), portfolio (Oportfolio)
and other investment (Oinv). These variables are normalized by country´s GDP and then standardized by de-meaning and by dividing by the
 standard deviation at  the country level. All the regressions include country and year dummies and the control variables included in Table 7
(GDP growth, spread long term interest, public debt, gross external debt, reserves GDP, credit GDP, credit GDP^2, vix variation, world GDP
 growth and US 10 year Treasury bill rates). The results are absolute values of heretoreskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation
adjusted standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME
ALL COUNTRIES
HIGH INCOME
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5.3.7 SUMMING UP 
 
  
Table 14
Panel data estimates. Summarizing the main results.
Dependent variables CI Ifdi Iportfolio Ioinv CO Ofdi Oport Ooinv
Institutional quality index 0.187** 0.289*** 0.069 -0.006 0.063 0.127** 0.089 0.045
Other control variables included [0.079] [0.044] [0.076] [0.078] [0.063] [0.055] [0.060] [0.066]
Voice and Accountability 0.19 0.21 -0.34 0.13 0.30 0.10 0.26 0.16
[0.260] [0.228] [0.244] [0.193] [0.204] [0.202] [0.234] [0.184]
Political Stability -0.19* -0.09 -0.17 0.00 -0.24** -0.10 -0.25 -0.08
[0.084] [0.113] [0.130] [0.089] [0.098] [0.129] [0.165] [0.091]
Government Effectiveness 0.39** 0.14 -0.06 0.25 0.36*** 0.53** 0.84*** -0.23
[0.150] [0.194] [0.257] [0.190] [0.120] [0.209] [0.172] [0.167]
Regulatory Quality 0.47*** 0.53** 0.49** -0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.26 -0.01
[0.151] [0.205] [0.221] [0.209] [0.155] [0.211] [0.223] [0.130]
Rule of Law -0.31 -0.34 0.15 -0.09 -0.05 -0.27 -0.62** 0.28
[0.262] [0.299] [0.233] [0.229] [0.287] [0.295] [0.251] [0.239]
Control of Corruption 0.09 0.34 0.14 -0.21 0.00 0.07 -0.40** 0.23
[0.148] [0.247] [0.180] [0.162] [0.109] [0.162] [0.177] [0.139]
Other control variables included
This table summarizes the results of table 7, 10 and 13. We present our estimates using the institutional quality index, and then decomposed by institutional factors. The dependent 
variables are Capital Inflows by foreign agents (CI) decomposed by instruments: foreign direct inflows (Ifdi), portfolio inflows (Iportfolio) and other investment (Ioinv) and capital outflows
by domestic agents (CO), decomposed by instruments: foreign investment (Ofdi), portfolio (Oportfolio) and other investment (Oinv). These variables are normalized by country´s GDP
and then standardized by de-meaning and by dividing by the standard deviation at  the country level. All the regressions include country and year and quarterly dummies and the 
 control variables included in Table 7 and 13. (GDP growth, spread long term interest, public debt, gross external debt, reserves GDP, credit GDP, credit GDP^2, vix variation, world
GDP growth and US 10 year Treasury bill rates). The results are absolute values of heretoreskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation adjusted standard errors.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
ALL COUNTRIES
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5.3.8 INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY DURING PERIODS OF FINANCIAL CRISES.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15
Panel data estimates. Institutional quality during crises
Dependent var iables CI CO CI CO CI CO
Institutional quality index 0.170* 0.066 0.152 0.392*** 0.294*** -0.048
[0.086] [0.063] [0.121] [0.129] [0.093] [0.078]
Crisis -0.281** -0.212*** -0.253 -0.214 -0.480* -0.576**
[0.109] [0.079] [0.166] [0.194] [0.286] [0.266]
Crisis*Institutional quality -0.040 -0.120*** 0.027 -0.015 -0.112 -0.247***
[0.032] [0.031] [0.068] [0.077] [0.073] [0.093]
CONTROL VARIABLES
PULL FACTORS
Gdp growth 0.028*** 0.005 0.025** 0.007 0.021** 0.003
[0.009] [0.008] [0.013] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008]
Spread interest lt 0.004 0.016** -0.030 0.015 0.015** 0.013*
[0.006] [0.007] [0.036] [0.035] [0.007] [0.007]
Public debt GDP -0.006** -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.004
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
External debt GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.011*** -0.007**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003]
Reserves GDP -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.010* 0.003
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.009]
Credit GDP 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.016** 0.014*
[0.005] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
 Credit GDP^2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PUSH FACTORS
VIX -0.047*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.029***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.008]
World gdp growth 0.094 0.073 0.083 0.103* 0.118 0.024
[0.065] [0.061] [0.067] [0.057] [0.073] [0.074]
US10yannual -0.213*** -0.153* -0.200* -0.185* -0.207** -0.095
[0.076] [0.082] [0.102] [0.098] [0.102] [0.100]
Observations 2,720 2,729 1,547 1,552 1,173 1,177
R-squared 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.11
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are capital inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP  and then
standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country, year andquarterly dummies. In 
addition, a crisis dummy is included and we interact it with institutional quality. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately by income.
The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
All countries High income Low and middle income
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Table 16
Panel data estimates. Institutional quality during crises
Dependent variables CI CO CI CO CI CO
Institutional quality index 0.166* 0.063 0.148 0.385*** 0.288*** -0.046
[0.086] [0.063] [0.121] [0.128] [0.094] [0.079]
Crisis -0.274** -0.207** -0.263 -0.235 -0.477 -0.576**
[0.110] [0.082] [0.165] [0.192] [0.286] [0.267]
Domestic crisis*Institutional quality -0.016 -0.102** 0.055 0.043 -0.085 -0.257**
[0.047] [0.049] [0.095] [0.098] [0.082] [0.099]
Global crisis*Institutional quality -0.063 -0.139*** 0.012 -0.047 -0.153* -0.232**
[0.040] [0.036] [0.066] [0.070] [0.081] [0.105]
CONTROL VARIABLES
PULL FACTORS
Gdp growth 0.028*** 0.005 0.025* 0.007 0.021** 0.003
[0.009] [0.008] [0.013] [0.011] [0.010] [0.008]
Spread interest lt 0.004 0.016** -0.028 0.018 0.015** 0.013*
[0.006] [0.007] [0.034] [0.034] [0.007] [0.007]
Public debt GDP -0.007*** -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.004
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
External debt GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.011*** -0.007**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003]
Reserves GDP -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.010* 0.003
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.009]
Credit GDP 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.016** 0.014
[0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
 Credit GDP^2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PUSH FACTORS
VIX -0.047*** -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.053*** -0.029***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.008]
World gdp growth 0.095 0.073 0.083 0.103* 0.119 0.024
[0.065] [0.061] [0.067] [0.057] [0.073] [0.074]
US10yannual -0.213*** -0.153* -0.200* -0.185* -0.207** -0.095
[0.076] [0.082] [0.102] [0.098] [0.102] [0.100]
Observations 2,720 2,729 1,547 1,552 1,173 1,177
R-squared 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.11
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are capital inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s GDP  and then
standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country,  year and quarter dummies. In
 addition, a crisis dummy is included and we interact it, distinguishing between global and domestic crisis, with institutional quality. The results are reported 
for all the sample, as well as separately by income. The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period. Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors are given in 
brackets.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
All countries High income Low and middle income
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Table 17
Panel data estimates. Institutional quality during the global financial crisis (GFC)
Dependent var iables CI CO CI CO CI CO
Institutional quality index 0.186** 0.065 0.225* 0.455*** 0.293*** -0.066
[0.079] [0.063] [0.113] [0.110] [0.091] [0.076]
GFC -0.214*** -0.170*** -0.007 -0.020 -0.554*** -0.975***
[0.064] [0.059] [0.114] [0.090] [0.190] [0.265]
GFC*Institutional quality 0.025 -0.190*** -0.049 -0.114** -0.071 -0.469***
[0.024] [0.030] [0.045] [0.048] [0.074] [0.125]
CONTROL VARIABLES
PULL FACTORS
Gdp growth 0.031*** 0.005 0.026** 0.008 0.024** 0.003
[0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]
Spread interest lt 0.004 0.018** -0.032 0.015 0.014** 0.014*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.035] [0.036] [0.007] [0.007]
Public debt GDP -0.007*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.004
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
External debt GDP -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.011*** -0.007**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.003]
Reserves GDP -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.011* -0.000
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.009]
Credit GDP 0.004 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.015** 0.012
[0.005] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
 Credit GDP^2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
PUSH FACTORS
VIX -0.045*** -0.033*** -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.050*** -0.028***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008]
World gdp growth 0.078 0.050 0.075 0.084 0.097 0.014
[0.064] [0.060] [0.066] [0.055] [0.072] [0.073]
US10yannual -0.198*** -0.131 -0.192* -0.167* -0.186* -0.084
[0.074] [0.082] [0.103] [0.099] [0.099] [0.100]
Observations 2,720 2,729 1,547 1,552 1,173 1,177
R-squared 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.11
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variables are capital inflows by foreign agents (CI) and capital outflows by domestic agents (CO), normalized by country´s
 GDP  and then standardized by de-meaning and dividing by the standard deviation at the country level. All the regressions include country 
quarter and year dummies. In addition, a crisis dummy for the global financial crisis (GFC) is included and we interact it with institutional 
quality. The results are reported for all the sample, as well as separately by income. The data covers 56 countries over the 1996-2012 period. 
Discroll-Kraay robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
All countries High income Low and middle income
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